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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Kyle A. Richardson appeals from his judgment of conviction for three counts of 
delivery of methamphetamine.  On appeal, he argues that the district court erred when it 
denied his motion to dismiss his prosecution for an alleged violation of his speedy trial 
rights; that the court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss based on an alleged 
failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers’ timelines; that the court 
abused its discretion by allowing, after offering a limiting instruction, a state’s witness to 
lay foundation for subsequent testimony, notwithstanding Richardson’s objection; and 
that the court abused its discretion in its order of restitution. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In September 2011, a confidential informant, Robert Bauer, in an effort to gain 
consideration on his own possession of methamphetamine charge, informed police that 
Richardson was a drug dealer.  (Trial Tr.,1 p.118, L.20 – p.119, L.20; p.120, L.19 – 
p.121, L.1.)  Officer Dammon directed Mr. Bauer to make a series of recorded phone 
calls setting up controlled drug buys.  (Id., p.120, Ls.14-18; p.122, L.16 – p.124, L.11.)  
Mr. Bauer successfully completed three controlled buys of methamphetamine from 
Richardson on September 7, 9, and 14, 2011.  (Id., p.133, Ls.10-24; p.140, L.22 – 
p.141, L.11; p.154, Ls.9-19; p.225, L.7 – p.227, L.16.)  Richardson was served with a 
summons to appear on January 4, 2012.  (R., pp.35-36.) 
                                            
1  “Trial Tr.” refers to the transcript of Richardson’s criminal trial held on December 7 




On February 22, 2012, the state charged Richardson with three counts of 
delivery of methamphetamine.  (R., pp.57-58.)  Before trial, Mr. Bauer, the state’s key 
witness, died.  (See R., p.125.)  Because Bauer had testified and was subject to cross-
examination at the preliminary hearing, the state sought to admit the preliminary hearing 
transcript.  (R., pp.79-80.)  Richardson filed motions in both this case and a separate 
case objecting to the admission of the transcript.  (R., pp.119-23.)  Due to the timing of 
Richardson’s motions, the district court had to vacate the trial setting.  (8/16/2012 Tr., 
p.13, L.25 – p.14, L.4.)  The court instead held a hearing on the motions and, ultimately, 
excluded the preliminary hearing testimony.  (R., pp.166-70.)  With permission from the 
Idaho Supreme Court, the state filed an interlocutory appeal.  (R., pp.182-86.)   
Ultimately, the state prevailed on appeal.  See State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 
524, 328 P.3d 504 (2014).  The remittitur issued on July 16, 2014 (R., p.204), and the 
district court held a status conference on July 24, 2014 (R., p.206).  During that hearing, 
the parties informed the district court that Richardson was no longer in the State of 
Idaho but was in federal custody somewhere out-of-state.  (7/24/2014 Tr., p.22, L.24 – 
p.24, L.7.)  The district court issued a bench warrant.  (R., p.205.)   
On February 2, 2015, Richardson filed a motion in which he requested a speedy 
trial and final disposition.  (R., pp.207-08.)  Richardson was, however, still in federal 
custody, and returning him to the State of Idaho required compliance with the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers (IAD).  The state lodged a detainer against Richardson on 
June 24, 2015.  (See R., p.273.)  Thereafter, on July 21, 2015, the state received the 
“Notice of Untried Indictment” with Richardson’s demand for speedy trial and all 




Richardson subsequently filed motions to dismiss his case based on an alleged 
violation of his speedy trial rights.  (R., pp.230-35, 244-47, 266-68.)  The district court 
denied the motion to dismiss, determining that the IAD applied to Richardson’s case 
and that speedy trial could not be invoked under the IAD until there was compliance 
with its requirements.  (R., p.273.) 
Richardson was brought back to Idaho on October 23, 2015 (see R., pp.281, 
365) and his trial began on December 7, 2015 (R., pp.313-23).  Following Richardson’s 
trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on each count of delivery of methamphetamine.  
(R., pp.324-25.)  The district court entered judgment against Richardson and sentenced 
him to concurrent unified sentences of 12 years with five years fixed on each count, 
running those sentences concurrently with Richardson’s federal sentence.  (R., pp.355-
57.)  The court also entered an order requiring Richardson to reimburse $2,100 to the 
Lewiston Police Department for the controlled-buy monies; $300 to the Idaho State 
Police for the analysis of the three samples of methamphetamine; and an additional 
$338.46 to the Idaho State Police for the travel and personnel expenses of a lab analyst 
who was subpoenaed to testify at Richardson’s trial; totaling $2,738.46 in restitution.  
(Aug. R., pp.9-11.)  Richardson filed a notice of appeal timely from his judgment of 






Richardson states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Did the district court err when it violated Mr. Richardson’s speedy 
trial rights? 
 
2. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Richardson’s motion to 
dismiss based on the State’s failure to comply with the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers’ 180[-]day deadline? 
 
3. Did the district court err in admitting evidence of Mr. Richardson’s 
prior bad acts? 
 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered 
Mr. Richardson to pay restitution in the absence of substantial evidence to 
support such an award? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.8.) 
 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Richardson failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion to dismiss this case based on an alleged speedy trial violation? 
 
2. Has Richardson failed to show that the district court erred when it determined 
that the state did not violate the Interstate Agreement on Detainers? 
 
3. Has Richardson failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it 
allowed the detective to lay foundation for his subsequent testimony about his 
investigation? 
 








Richardson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His 
Motion To Dismiss This Case Based On An Alleged Speedy Trial Violation  
 
A. Introduction 
This case began on January 4, 2012, when the state filed its initial criminal 
complaint and Richardson was served with a summons to appear.  (R., pp.32-36.)  
Between the preliminary hearing and the initial trial date, the state’s confidential 
informant died.  (See R., p.125.)  Because the confidential informant had testified under 
oath and been subject to cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, the state 
requested to introduce his preliminary hearing testimony at trial.  (R., pp.79-80.)  
Richardson objected (R., pp.119-23) and the district court excluded the testimony (R., 
pp.166-70).  The state filed an interlocutory appeal and ultimately prevailed on June 24, 
2014.  (R., pp.192-202.)  The remittitur issued on July 16, 2014.  (R., p.204.) 
Following remittitur, the district court held a status conference during which the 
parties informed the court that Richardson was in federal custody.  (R., p.206; see also 
7/24/2014 Tr., p.22, L.24 – p.24, L.7.)  Richardson had been arrested and taken into 
federal custody on December 1, 2012.  (R., p.231.)  The district court issued a bench 
warrant on July 24, 2014.  (R., p.205.)  Eventually, Richardson was located and, after 
complying with the procedures set forth in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, was 
ultimately returned to Idaho on October 23, 2015.  (R., p.281.)2  Richardson was 
brought to trial on December 7, 2015.  (R., pp.313-23.) 
                                            
2  Repeatedly, Richardson claims that he “sat in jail” or “in prison” while waiting for his 
trial to commence.  (Appellant’s brief, p.9.)  Notwithstanding these assertions, the 




Prior to trial, Richardson filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that his speedy trial 
rights had been violated.  (R., pp.244-47, 266-68.)  The district court denied the motion.  
(R., p.273.)  On appeal, Richardson asserts that the district court erred when it denied 
his motion to dismiss, arguing, as he did below, that both his constitutional and statutory 
speedy trial rights were violated.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-21.)  Application of the correct 
legal standards to the facts of this case, however, shows no violation of Richardson’s 
speedy trial rights.  The district court correctly denied Richardson’s motion to dismiss 
and should be affirmed. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant’s rights to a speedy trial 
presents a mixed question of law and fact.  State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d 
931, 933 (2000); State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 852, 153 P.3d 1195, 1198 (Ct. App. 
2006).  The appellate court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported 
by substantial and competent evidence, but freely reviews the trial court’s application of 
the law to the facts found.  Avila, 143 Idaho at 852, 153 P.3d at 1198; State v. Davis, 
141 Idaho 828, 835, 118 P.3d 160, 167 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 
C. Richardson’s Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights Were Not Violated  
“Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13 
of the Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial.”  
State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct. App. 2007).  When 
                                                                                                                                            
until he was returned to Idaho on October 23, 2015; Richardson only requested credit 
for time served “from October 23, 2015, the date that he arrived in Nez Perce County 




analyzing claims of speedy trial violations under the state and federal constitutions, the 
Idaho appellate courts utilize the four-part balancing test set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).  State v. Young, 136 Idaho 
113, 117, 29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001).  The factors to be considered are:  (1) the length of 
the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his or her right to 
a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice occasioned by the delay.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.  
Contrary to Richardson’s arguments on appeal (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-20), balancing 
of these factors in this case supports the district court’s determination that Richardson 
failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial. 
 
1. The Delay Of Almost Four Years Between Richardson’s Arrest And Trial 
Necessitates Inquiry Into The Other Barker Factors 
 
The first factor for this Court to consider is the length of the delay leading up to 
trial.  “The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism.  Until there is 
some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the 
other factors that go into the balance.”  Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.  For purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment, “the period of delay is measured from the date there is ‘a formal 
indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to 
answer a criminal charge.’”  Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citing United 
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971); Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953).  
“Similarly, under the Idaho Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the date 
formal charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first.”  Lopez, 




The state filed its initial criminal complaint, the magistrate found probable cause 
and bound Richardson over for trial, and Richardson was served with a summons to 
appear on January 4, 2012.  (R., pp.32-36.)  Richardson was finally brought to trial on 
December 7, 2015.  (R., pp.313-23; see also Trial Tr.)  As Richardson notes on appeal 
(Appellant’s brief, p.12), that is a delay of almost four years.  The state agrees with 
Richardson that such a lengthy delay triggers the balancing test of Barker. 
Once the balancing test is triggered, the length of delay also becomes a factor in 
and of itself.  Avila, 143 Idaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199.  However, the length of the 
delay is not dispositive.  None of the four Barker factors is by itself “either a necessary 
or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.”  Barker, 
407 U.S. at 533.  Because (as shown below) the lengthy delays in this case were either 
directly attributable to Richardson’s actions, or were otherwise for valid reasons, and 
because (despite his arguments to the contrary) Richardson was not unfairly prejudiced 
by the delay, the length of the delay should be excused. 
 
2. The Lengthy Delays In This Case Are Attributable To Richardson 
 
Implicit in the standards applicable to claims of constitutional speedy trial 
violations is the recognition that “pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly 
justifiable.”  Avila, 143 Idaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199 (citing Doggett v. United States, 
505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992)).  For that reason, different weights are assigned to different 
reasons for the delay.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.  As explained by the Supreme Court: 
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense 
should be weighted heavily against the government.  A more neutral 
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted 
less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate 




than with the defendant.  Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing 
witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. 
 
Id. at 531 (footnote omitted).  However, delays “caused by the defense weigh against 
the defendant.”  Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009).  As the Supreme Court 
noted in Barker, “if delay is attributable to the defendant, then his waiver may be given 
effect under standard waiver doctrine.”  Barker, 407 U.S. at 529. 
On appeal, Richardson specifically complains of two delays.  He first complains 
that the state caused his trial to be delayed by asking for a continuance due to a key 
witness’ unavailability on the original trial dates.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.14-15.)  But he 
then notes that “[t]he second trial setting was still within the speedy trial limits.”  (Id., 
p.15.)  Regardless, requesting a brief continuance due to a key witness’ unavailability 
falls squarely within the “valid reason” exception of Barker, and is a justified delay. 
Moreover, the state’s request for a continuance for an unavailable witness was 
not the only such request prior to the first trial setting.  Both parties stipulated to a 
continuance of the preliminary hearing (R., p.45), and Richardson also requested a two-
week extension during the pretrial briefing phase (R., p.70).  Both of these delays of the 
court’s schedule are, at least in part, attributable to Richardson. 
Richardson next complains that the state’s interlocutory appeal delayed his trial 
by two years.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.)  The delay necessitated by the state’s 
appeal does not count toward the speedy trial calculation under the facts of this case.  
On March 23, 2012, between the preliminary hearing and the initial trial setting in this 
case, the state’s confidential informant, Robert Bauer, died.  (See R., p.125.)  Because 
Mr. Bauer had testified under oath at the preliminary hearing and had been subjected to 




under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1).  (R., pp.79-80; see also pp.85-102.)  
Richardson objected to the introduction of the preliminary hearing testimony and asked 
the district court for an order excluding it on the ground that it would violate his 
confrontation rights.  (R., pp.119-23.)  The district court granted Richardson’s motion on 
that ground.  (R., pp.166-70.)   
But that ground was erroneous.  As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in State 
v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 527-28, 328 P.3d 504, 507-08 (2014),3 all that is required 
to satisfy the defendant’s confrontation rights is an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine the witness.  The magistrate court did not limit the scope of Richardson’s 
cross-examination; the cross-examination included all relevant trial issues; and 
Mr. Bauer did not hamper Richardson’s cross-examination by being evasive or 
untruthful in his answers.  Id. at 529, 328 P.3d at 509.  Richardson therefore had an 
adequate opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Bauer during the preliminary hearing, and 
the district court erred when it concluded otherwise.  Id. at 527-30, 328 P.3d at 507-10.  
Moreover, contrary to his arguments before the district court, Richardson had sufficient 
opportunity to prepare to cross-examine Mr. Bauer because, even before the state 
revealed his identity, the evidence in this case showed that Richardson knew that 
Mr. Bauer was the confidential informant.  Id. at 531-32, 328 P.3d at 511-12.  The Idaho 
Supreme Court therefore held that the preliminary hearing transcripts could be admitted 
at trial.  Id. at 532, 328 P.3d at 512. 
Richardson acknowledged below that, “since the trials were vacated because of 
some lateness of the motions” to exclude the testimony, the delays were at least in part 
                                            
3  The Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Richardson is included in the clerk’s 




attributable to him and there was no “implication of speedy trial at all because of that.”  
(8/16/2012 Tr., p.15, Ls.4-8.)  Similarly, because Richardson caused the need for the 
interlocutory appeal by inviting the district court to exclude essential evidence on an 
erroneous basis, the attendant delay was also attributable to Richardson and does not 
implicate his speedy trial rights.   
Even if the delay for the interlocutory appeal were attributable to the state, it still 
would not count toward a speedy trial calculation.  As the United States Supreme Court 
has previously held, where “[t]here is no showing of bad faith or dilatory purpose on the 
Government’s part”; where “the Government’s position [on appeal] was strong”—and 
the Court recognized that reversals on appeal “are prima facie evidence of the 
reasonableness of the Government’s actions”; and “the District Court chose not to 
subject [the defendant] to any actual restraints pending the outcome of the appeal[]”; the 
delay caused by an interlocutory appeal should not be accorded any weight in 
determining whether the defendant suffered a violation of his speedy trial rights.  United 
States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316 (1986). 
Richardson has failed to show any “bad faith or dilatory purpose on the state’s 
part” in this case.  Rather, the state’s appeal was necessary:  The witness, Mr. Bauer, 
was the confidential informant who directly participated in the controlled buys with 
Richardson, which were the bases for the charges against him.  And as the state 
explained, it could not procure any other evidence of this direct nature.  (R., p.155.)  The 
state prevailed on appeal, see Richardson, supra; so there is prima facie evidence, 
unchallenged by Richardson, that the state’s appeal was reasonable.  And finally, 




district court did not place any restraints upon him; rather, Richardson was arrested on 
December 1, 2012, and was subsequently convicted and incarcerated on unrelated 
federal charges during the pendency of the entire appeal.  (R., p.231.)  Any delay 
caused by the state’s interlocutory appeal is reasonable and should not be given any 
weight in determining whether Richardson’s speedy trial rights were violated. 
Finally, though not noted by Richardson on appeal, another substantial delay in 
this case was caused by Richardson’s incarceration in federal prison on an unrelated 
conviction.  As noted above, Richardson was first taken into federal custody on 
December 1, 2012.  (R., p.231.)  After remittitur entered in the interlocutory appeal on 
July 16, 2014 (R., p.204), the district court held a hearing on Richardson’s case (R., 
p.206; 7/24/2014 Tr.).  During that hearing, the parties informed that court that 
Richardson was in federal custody, and, in accordance with the parties’ request, the 
district court issued a bench warrant.  (7/24/2014 Tr., p.22, L.24 – p.24, L.7; R., p.205.)  
That warrant was not returned until October 23, 2015 (R., p.281), when Richardson was 
finally brought back to the State of Idaho.  This delay, occasioned by Richardson’s 
federal conviction and incarceration, is not attributable to the state. 
 
3. Richardson Asserted His Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights 
 
The third factor in the Barker analysis is whether and how the defendant asserted 
his constitutional right to a speedy trial.  A defendant’s assertion of his right is “entitled 
to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of 
the right.”  Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32; Davis, 141 Idaho at 839, 118 P.3d at 171.  
“[F]ailure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was 




The district court found, and it is not disputed, that Richardson asserted his 
speedy trial rights.  (See R., p.273.)  Richardson asserts that the district court erred in 
concluding that Richardson’s assertion did not become effective until June 24, 2015, 
noting that he “caused to be filed” a speedy trial demand on February 2, 2015.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.16-17.)  Because Richardson was in federal custody when he 
began to assert his speedy trial rights, the district court is correct under the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers (IAD) that no demand became effective until after the formal 
lodging of a detainer.  See I.C. § 19-5001.  The IAD is addressed in greater detail in 
Argument II.  However, for purposes of this argument, it is sufficient to recognize that 
Richardson did assert his speedy trial rights. 
 
4. Richardson Failed To Establish That He Was Unfairly Prejudiced By The 
Delays In His Case 
 
The final and most important factor in the Barker analysis is the nature and 
extent of any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay.  Barker, 
407 U.S. at 532.  As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests of defendants which 
the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect.  Those interests are (1) to 
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and 
concern of the accused, and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will 
be impaired. 
 
Young, 136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).  “The third of 
these is the most significant because a hindrance to adequate preparation of the 
defense ‘skews the fairness of the entire system.’”  Lopez, 144 Idaho at 355, 160 P.3d 




Though Richardson was incarcerated while awaiting trial, and during that time 
may have felt the anxiety and concern that any incarcerated individual would suffer, he 
was in federal custody, not in Idaho’s custody.  In fact, notwithstanding Richardson’s 
assertions to the contrary (see Appellant’s brief, p.9), it appears that Richardson never 
“sat in jail” in relation to this case until he was returned to Idaho on October 23, 2015 
(see R., p.365 (only requesting credit for time served from that date)).  Contrary to his 
arguments on appeal (Appellant’s brief, pp.17-18), any prejudice Richardson suffered 
while in federal custody is due to his being convicted and incarcerated in an unrelated 
federal case, not to delays in his Idaho case. 
Richardson also argues that he suffered prejudice due to the fading memories of 
Officers Dammon and Yount, two witnesses for the state.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.18-19.)  
The state submits that the fading memories of key state’s witnesses—the investigating 
officers in this case—does not prejudice the defense, but the prosecution.  The United 
States Supreme Court recognized as much when it noted: 
Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic.  As the time between the 
commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may become 
unavailable or their memories may fade.  If the witnesses support the 
prosecution, its case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so.  And it is 
the prosecution which carries the burden of proof. 
 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 521.  Because, if anything, the delay prejudiced the prosecution, 
“this factor should be given a very light weight, if any,” for Richardson.  Avila, 143 Idaho 





5. A Balancing Of The Barker Factors Weighs Against A Finding Of A 
Speedy Trial Violation 
 
The four Barker factors, together with any other relevant circumstances, must be 
balanced and weighed to determine whether an individual’s right to a speedy trial was 
violated.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.  In this case, though there was a considerable delay 
in bringing Richardson to trial, because almost all of that delay is directly attributable to 
Richardson’s inviting the district court to make an erroneous ruling on the admissibility 
of essential evidence in his case (which necessitated an interlocutory appeal), and his 
federal conviction and incarceration on unrelated charges, it does not count toward the 
speedy trial calculation.  Moreover, though Richardson did assert his speedy trial rights, 
he failed to demonstrate that he was unfairly prejudiced by the delay.  Richardson has 
therefore failed to show error in the denial of his motion to dismiss. 
 
D. Richardson Waived His Statutory Speedy Trial Rights  
Richardson also argues that his statutory speedy trial rights were violated.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.20-21.)  This argument fails because Richardson waived his 
statutory speedy trial rights when he caused his trial to be postponed.  Under Idaho 
Code § 19-3501(2), the district court, “unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must 
order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed … [i]f a defendant, whose trial has 
not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial within six (6) months 
from the date that the information is filed with the court.”  On February 22, 2012, the 
state filed an information charging Richardson with three counts of delivery of 
methamphetamine.  (R., pp.57-58.)  The trial was initially set for June 4, 2012 (R., 




have been unavailable on the initial date (R., pp.72-74).  The subsequent date would 
have been within the statutory timeframe. 
However, less than two weeks before trial, Richardson filed motions in both this 
case and a related case objecting to the state’s motion to admit the preliminary hearing 
transcript at trial.  (R., pp.119-23.)  At a hearing the following week, the district court 
determined that, “because the motions filed on [Richardson’s] behalf [had] come in very 
close to the trial date” and needed to be ruled upon, it would have to “vacate the trial 
settings for Monday.”  (8/16/2012 Tr., p.13, L.25 – p.14, L.4.)  Defense counsel 
concurred and further assured the court that, because the trial was vacated due to 
“some lateness of the motions,” the defense did not “consider that there [was] any 
implication of speedy trial at all because of that.”  (Id., p.15, Ls.4-8.)  Because the 
“lateness of [Richardson’s] motions” required the district court to “vacate the trial 
setting,” Richardson waived his statutory speedy trial rights.  State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 
327, 332, 256 P.3d 735, 740 (2011).   
Even if Richardson had not waived his statutory speedy trial rights when he 
caused his trial date to be postponed, there still would be no violation of those rights 
because, as shown above, any delays in this case were for good cause.  “[G]ood cause 
means that there is a substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the 
delay.”  Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936.  The first significant delay in this case 
arose from the filing of a necessary interlocutory appeal to correct the district court’s 
erroneous exclusion of the confidential informant’s prior testimony.  “An interlocutory 
appeal by the State from an order excluding evidence ordinarily is a valid reason that 




case:  The state did not appeal because it wanted to delay the case; the state appealed 
because the confidential informant was the only witness who directly participated in the 
controlled buys with Richardson, and his testimony was essential to the state’s case.  
And the state prevailed on appeal, which is prima facie evidence that its arguments and 
grounds for appeal were reasonable.  Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 316. 
The second significant delay in bringing Richardson to trial, as outlined above, 
was caused by his conviction and incarceration on unrelated federal charges.  After 
remittitur entered on the state’s interlocutory appeal, the parties informed the district 
court that Richardson was being held out-of-state in federal custody.  (7/24/2014 Tr., 
p.22, L.24 – p.24, L.7.)  The state ordinarily cannot proceed against a defendant until 
that defendant is within its jurisdiction.  After compliance with the IAD, Richardson was 
finally returned to the State of Idaho on October 23, 2015.  (R., p.281.)  And he was 
brought to trial on December 7, 2015.  (R., pp.313-23.)   
Thus, either Richardson waived his statutory speedy trial rights when he caused 
his trial date to be postponed by filing the late motions, or any subsequent delays of his 
trial were for good cause.  Under either theory, Richardson has failed to show that his 
statutory speedy trial rights were violated.  The district court’s order dismissing 
Richardson’s motion to dismiss should be affirmed. 
Finally, even if Richardson had not waived his statutory speedy trial rights, and 
the interlocutory appeal and Richardson’s absence from the state did not constitute 
good cause sufficient to justify delay of his trial beyond the six-month statutory period of 
Idaho Code § 19-3501, any error in the court’s order denying Richardson’s motion to 




defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded.”  Where, as here, a defendant is facing felony charges, the remedy for a 
statutory speedy trial violation is dismissal without prejudice.  See I.C. §§ 19-3501, 
19-3506.  Thus, even had the trial court dismissed the case on the basis of a statutory 
speedy trial violation, the state could have simply refiled the charges and proceeded to 
trial against Richardson in a new criminal action.   
 
II. 
Richardson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Determined That 
The State Did Not Violate The Interstate Agreement On Detainers 
 
A. Introduction 
As noted above, Richardson filed below a motion to dismiss his case based on 
an alleged violation of his speedy trial rights.  (R., pp.244-47, 266-68.)  The district court 
denied that motion, finding that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) applied to 
Richardson’s case, that a detainer was not lodged until June 24, 2015, and that speedy 
trial could not be invoked until that date.  (R., p.273.)  Richardson asserts that the 
district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss because, he argues (contrary to 
precedent), his substantial compliance with the IAD should have been sufficient to 
trigger the IAD’s statute of limitation.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.21-36.)  Application of the 
correct law to the facts before the district court, however, shows no error in the district 
court’s denial of Richardson’s motion to dismiss based on the IAD. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The interpretation and construction of a statute presents questions of law over 




102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405, 94 P.3d 709, 710 
(Ct. App. 2004).   
 
C. The State Of Idaho Did Not Violate The Interstate Agreement On Detainers’ 
Statute Of Limitation 
 
The authority to extradite fugitives and return them to answer criminal charges 
filed against them is found in Article IV, § 2, Cl. 2 of the United States Constitution, 
which reads:  
A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, 
who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand 
of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, 
to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.   
 
This provision gives states the right to obtain the return of fugitives who flee to other 
states.  It does not, however, create a mandatory obligation on the part of any state to 
seek or secure the return of such fugitives.  Rather, the decision to seek extradition lies 
wholly within the discretion of the executive authority of the demanding state, and a 
fugitive has no right to compel his extradition.  Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1178 
(10th Cir. 1999); Brownfield v. Stovall, 85 F.App’x 123, 126 (10th Cir. 2003). 
Unlike the demanding state, which has discretion to choose whether to seek 
extradition, asylum states generally do not have such discretion.  As the United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly explained, “the duty imposed by the Extradition Clause 
on the asylum State [is] mandatory” and “afford[s] no discretion to the executive officers 
or the courts of the asylum State.”  New Mexico, ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed, 524 U.S. 151, 
154-55 (1998) (citing Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 227 (1987); California v. 




Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1860)).  There is, however, an exception to this rule under the 
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, which provides that when  
a criminal prosecution has been instituted against such person under the 
laws of [the asylum] state and is still pending, the governor in his 
discretion, either may surrender such person on demand of the executive 
authority of another state or hold him until he has been tried and 
discharged, or convicted and punished in this state. 
 
I.C. § 19-4519. 
Recognizing both that “charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based 
on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy 
trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which 
obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation,” and that “proceedings with 
reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, 
cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures,” the federal 
government and most states (including Idaho) have adopted the IAD “to encourage the 
expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper 
status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or 
complaints.”  I.C. § 19-5001(a).  Thus, the basic purposes of the IAD are to give 
prisoners the right to an expeditious trial after compliance with its terms, and to give 
states the right to obtain a prisoner for the purposes of trial.  Alabama v. Bozeman, 
533 U.S. 146, 151 (2001). 
To facilitate the expeditious and orderly disposition of these charges, after 
specific requirements have been met, the IAD requires states to bring the fugitive to trial 
within 180 days.  I.C. § 19-5001(c)(1).  After reviewing the record, the district court 




not violated Richardson’s rights under the IAD.  (R., p.273.)  As the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has previously recognized: 
For a defendant to invoke the speedy trial provision of the IAD, three 
events must occur: (1) the receiving State must place a detainer on a 
prisoner in the sending State, I.C. § 19–5001(c)(1); (2) the prisoner must 
deliver to the warden or custodial official holding custody over the prisoner 
a written notice and request for final disposition, I.C. § 19–5001(c)(2); and 
(3) the warden or custodial official must promptly forward the prisoner’s 
request and a certificate containing the “term of commitment under which 
the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to 
be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of 
parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole 
agency relating to the prisoner” to the appropriate prosecutor and district 
court in the receiving State, I.C. § 19–5001(c)(1), (2).   
 
State v. Mangum, 153 Idaho 705, 709, 291 P.3d 44, 48 (Ct. App. 2012) (footnote 
omitted). 
In this case, the state requested that a detainer be lodged against Richardson on 
June 24, 2015.  (R., pp.255, 273.)  After that detainer was lodged, Richardson then 
delivered his written notice and request for final disposition in July.  (R., pp.257-64.)  
Federal correctional officials forwarded Richardson’s request, together with all 
appropriate certificates, to the Idaho prosecutor on July 22, 2015.  (R., p.257.)  Finally, 
Richardson was brought to trial on December 7, 2015 (See Trial Tr.; see also R., 
pp.241, 313-23), which was within the applicable 180-day limit.  Richardson’s rights 
under the IAD were not violated. 
On appeal, Richardson argues that he substantially complied with the IAD by 
sending letters to the court and county prosecutor’s office requesting that he be 
returned to Idaho for his trial, and therefore the 180-day limit began months earlier than 




Idaho requires strict compliance, not substantial compliance, with the IAD.  Mangum, 
153 Idaho at 713, 291 P.3d at 52.  As detailed above, Richardson did not strictly comply 
with the requirements of the IAD until July 22, 2015.   
Richardson further asserts that the strict compliance requirement of Mangum is 
tempered where “intentional interference by State parties is shown.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.27-30 (citing Mangum, 153 Idaho at 713, 291 P.3d at 52).)  Richardson then appears 
to argue that the state’s inability to expedite his extradition after receiving his non-
compliant “demands” for trial constitutes “intentional interference.”  (See Appellant’s 
brief, pp.28-30.)  This argument fails on two grounds:  First, as shown at the outset of 
this argument, a defendant cannot compel his extradition.  It is entirely within the 
discretion of the executive of the demanding state if and when to seek extradition; it is 
therefore entirely within its discretion if and when to file a detainer against a fugitive.  
Second, this is the exact scenario addressed by the Court of Appeals in Mangum.  See 
id., 153 Idaho at 707-08, 713, 291 P.3d at 46-47, 52.  That Court’s holding, requiring 
strict compliance, is no less applicable under the facts of this case. 
Finally, Richardson asserts that the bench warrant issued by the district court on 
July 24, 2014, is the equivalent of a detainer.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.30-33.)  This 
argument fails on multiple grounds.  First, as noted above, Idaho precedent requires 
strict compliance with the IAD.  Mangum, 153 Idaho at 713, 291 P.3d at 52.  The mere 
“equivalent” of a detainer is insufficient to strictly comply with the requirements of the 
IAD.  Second, under the IAD, the detainer is to be lodged by the appropriate 
prosecuting officer of the demanding state.  See I.C. § 19-5001(c)(1), (d)(1).  A bench 




Third, the United States Supreme Court has defined a detainer as “a request filed by a 
criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated asking the 
institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when release 
of the prisoner is imminent.”  Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985).  The bench 
warrant, on its face, does none of these things.  (See R., p.205.)  While a bench warrant 
issued by a district court may be a prerequisite for lodging a detainer, the bench warrant 
is not a detainer. 
Under the IAD, the 180-day limit was triggered when Idaho officials actually 
received all of the required certificates and demands from the federal authorities.  Idaho 
law requires strict compliance with the request provision of the IAD.  As demonstrated 
by the record, Idaho officials did not receive the required certificates until July 22, 2015.  
(R., p.257.)  Richardson was brought to trial on December 7, 2015.  (R., pp.313-23; see 
also Trial Tr.)  The trial thus commenced within the 180-day limit established by the IAD.  
Richardson has therefore failed to show any violation of his rights under the IAD.  The 
district court correctly denied Richardson’s motion to dismiss and should be affirmed. 
 
III. 
Richardson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Allowed The Detective To Lay Foundation For His Subsequent Investigation 
 
A. Introduction 
During the criminal trial, while providing foundation for his subsequent testimony, 
the prosecutor asked Detective Dammon how he became involved in the criminal case.  
(Trial Tr., p.118, L.20 – p.119, L.3.)  The detective answered that he had received 




preemptory objection, which was overruled for being premature.  (Id., p.119, Ls.6-12.)  
The following exchange then ensued: 
BY MR. COLEMAN: 
Q. So how—how did you become involved on that day? 
 
A. I was provided information from a confidential informant about a 
Kyle Richardson being involved in the distribution— 
 
MR. RADAKOVICH: Objection. 
 
THE WITNESS: —of controlled substances. 
 
MR. RADAKOVICH: It’s hearsay. 
 
MR. COLEMAN: May I respond? 
 
MR. RADAKOVICH: More than that, it’s a violation of 404(b). 
 
(Id., p.119, Ls.13-24.)  The district court granted the prosecutor leave to respond and 
the prosecutor explained,  
Your Honor, this isn’t hearsay.  It’s being used to show—it’s not being 
used to show the truth of the matter asserted; it’s just being used to show 
the effect it had on this listener in terms of what he did with his 
investigation, the next step. 
 
(Id., p.119, L.25 – p.120, L.6.)  The district court agreed and, with a limiting instruction, 
allowed the testimony as follows: 
Well, I’m going to allow it.  It’s foundational.  The jury is instructed that this 
is information being provided only to show the foundation for what the 
officer did.  It’s not for the truth of the matter of what’s been said by the 
out-of-court statement. 
 
(Id., p.120, Ls.7-12.)  The district court never ruled on the Rule 404(b) objection. 
On appeal, Richardson argues that the district court abused its discretion by 




(Appellant’s brief, pp.36-48.)  Application of the correct legal principles to the facts of 
this case, however, shows no abuse of discretion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009) 
(citations omitted).  “In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, this Court will 
grant relief on appeal only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties.”  
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted). 
 
C. The Testimony Elicited From Detective Dammon Was Not Hearsay 
 
As noted above, Richardson objected at trial to the elicited testimony on the 
basis that it was hearsay.  (Trial Tr., p.119, Ls.13-21.)  Hearsay “is a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  I.R.E. 801(c).  But this testimony 
was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but only to show its effect on 
the detective, in terms of why he commenced the investigation.  (See Trial Tr., p.120, 
Ls.1-6.)  And the district court took the extra step of instructing the jury to ensure that 
the testimony would not be considered for the truth of the matter asserted, but only as 
foundation for the detective’s investigation.  (Id., p.120, Ls.7-12.)  Because the elicited 
testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and the district court 




asserted, it was not hearsay.  The district court properly overruled Richardson’s hearsay 
objection and should be affirmed. 
 
D. Contrary To Richardson’s Arguments On Appeal, Detective Dammon’s Elicited 
Testimony Should Not Be Excluded Under Rule 404(B) 
 
On appeal, Richardson does not challenge the district court’s actual ruling; 
instead, he claims that the evidence should have been excluded under 404(b).  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.36-48.)  This argument fails.  Under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.”  If the evidence had been 
admitted for the purpose of showing that Richardson had previously dealt drugs, such 
evidence would be properly analyzed under Rule 404(b).  But that is not what happened 
in this case.  Rather, as shown above, the prosecutor noted that the evidence was 
being offered, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show why Detective 
Dammon became involved in the investigation.  (Trial Tr., p.119, L.14 – p.120, L.6.)  
And the district court gave the jury specific limiting instructions, explaining that the 
evidence was only admitted for the purpose of foundation and could not be considered 
for the truth of the matter asserted.  (Id., p.120, Ls.7-12.)  Because this evidence was 
specifically not admitted “to prove [Richardson’s] character … in order to show that [he] 
acted in conformity therewith,” it is not 404(b) evidence. 
Richardson further argues that the district court admitted the testimony as res 
gestae.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.39-44.)  This argument is without merit.  As can be seen 
through a reading of the transcript, nowhere does that term—or any of its analogues—




not given notice that the state would use the supposed 404(b) evidence.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.44-46.)  This argument is too without merit.  First, as shown above, the elicited 
testimony is specifically not 404(b) evidence.  Second, while Richardson’s objection was 
likely sufficient to preserve his generalized 404(b) argument, he never raised the issue 
of notice below, and this specific argument is therefore not preserved.  See State v. 
Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 367, 347 P.3d 1025, 1028 (Ct. App. 2015) (“For an objection 
to be preserved for appellate review, either the specific ground for the objection must be 
clearly stated or the basis of the objection must be apparent from the context.”).   
 
E. Even If The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Permitting The Prosecutor To 
Elicit The Challenged Testimony, Such Error Was Necessarily Harmless  
 
Even had the district court abused its discretion by allowing the elicited 
testimony, such would not constitute reversible error because it would be harmless.  
“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected ….”  I.R.E. 103(a).  See also I.C.R. 52 (“Any 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded.”).  In determining whether error is harmless, “[t]he inquiry is whether, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even 
without the admission of the challenged evidence.”  State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 
669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citations omitted). 
This Court may determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the elicited testimony 
did not affect Richardson’s conviction on at least two grounds.  First, as shown above, 
the district court properly instructed the jury, eliminating the potential for prejudice to 




Court “presume[s] that a jury follows the instructions it is given.”  State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 
1, 7, 304 P.3d 276, 282 (2013).  If the jury followed the instructions in this case, then it 
only considered the testimony as foundation for the officer’s investigation and not for the 
truth of any matters asserted, and there is no prejudice.   
Second, the jury did not convict Richardson because there was evidence that a 
convicted drug user, in an effort to mitigate the punishment he was facing for his use, 
accused Richardson of also being involved in the distribution of drugs.  It convicted 
Richardson based on the overwhelming evidence that he, on three separate occasions, 
delivered methamphetamine to the confidential informant.  (See Trial Tr., p.122, L.13 – 
p.166, L.13; p.224, L.12 – p.227, L.16; p.254, L.19 – p.271, L.2; State’s Exs. 4-11.)  This 
Court, therefore, may determine beyond a reasonable doubt that omission of the 
challenged testimony did not contribute to Richardson’s conviction. 
The district court correctly overruled Richardson’s trial objection on hearsay 
grounds because the elicited testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted and therefore was not hearsay.  Richardson’s argument that admission of the 
testimony violated Rule 404(b) also fails because the testimony did not present 404(b) 
evidence.  Finally, even had the district court abused its discretion by allowing the 
challenged testimony, such error would necessarily be harmless because that testimony 











The district court ordered Richardson to pay restitution in the amount of 
$2,738.46 pursuant to Idaho Code § 37-2732(k).  (Aug. R., p.11.)  Of this total, $2,100 
would be paid to the Lewiston Police Department to reimburse it for the “buy money” it 
expended for the drug transactions, and $638.46 would be paid to the Idaho State 
Police for analysis on three separate samples of methamphetamine and for the travel 
and personnel expenses of an expert witness at Richardson’s trial, Officer David C. 
Sincerbeaux.  (Aug. R., pp.9-11.)  On appeal, Richardson challenges $300 of the buy 
money and the expenses of the expert witness, which totaled $338.46.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.49-54.)  Richardson’s challenges fail.  The district court’s award of restitution 
should be affirmed. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed to the 
trial court’s discretion.  State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211, 296 P.3d 412, 417 (Ct. App. 
2013).  The trial court’s factual findings in relation to restitution will not be disturbed if 
supported by substantial evidence.  State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 
276 (2013). 
 
C. The District Court’s Order Of Restitution Was Appropriate  
 
“Restitution may be ordered by the district court under I.C. § 37-2732(k) once a 




Idaho Code.”  State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257-58, 281 P.3d 90, 94-95 (2012).  
“Since I.C. § 37-2732(k) is short on specific guidance regarding the nature of a 
restitution award or the procedure to obtain such an award, we find guidance in the 
general restitution statute, I.C. § 19-5304.”  Id.  Under that statute, a restitution award 
must be based “upon the preponderance of evidence submitted by the prosecutor, 
defendant, victim, or presentence investigator.”  State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 170, 
345 P.3d 226, 229 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing I.C. § 19-5304(6)).  A restitution award “will 
not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to 
support a conclusion.”  Id. (citing Straub, 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d at 276). 
The district court’s restitution award was supported by substantial evidence.  
Below, the state submitted evidence both in the form of exhibits, which included receipts 
from the Lewiston Police Department and the Idaho State Police, and direct testimony in 
response to concerns raised by the defense.  Exhibit A showed that the Lewiston Police 
Department had expended buy money in the amounts of $200 on September 7, 2011; 
$400 on September 9, 2011; $1,200 on September 14, 2011; and an additional $300 on 
September 23, 2011.  (Aug. R., p.4.)  Detective Dammon, who prepared the document, 
explained that the first three disbursements were for drug buys.  (5/19/2016 Tr., p.16, 
Ls.12-17.)  However, during two of those buys, the police team received drugs in 
advance, and so still owed money, hence the additional $300.  (Id., p.16, Ls.18-24; see 
also Trial Tr., p.165, Ls.10-20; p.224, L.19 – p.225, L.12.)  All of the amounts requested, 
totaling $2,100, were expended during the course of the police investigation.  




Exhibits B-E detailed the expenses of the Idaho State Police.  Exhibit B was the 
subpoena commanding Officer Sincerbeaux, a forensic expert, to appear at 
Richardson’s trial.  (Aug. R., p.5.)  Officer Sincerbeaux appeared as an expert witness 
at trial.  (Trial Tr., pp.252-73; see also Aug. R., p.10.)  Exhibit C was the receipt for 
costs incurred for the expert witness’s travel and hourly expenses.  (Aug. R., p.6.)  It 
showed that the witness had accrued 5.5 hours of work at $37.32 per hour for $205.26, 
and per diem, lodging, and transportation costs of $133.20, for a total of $338.46.  (Id.)  
Exhibits D and E were receipts for costs incurred for the forensic analysis performed by 
the Idaho State Lab on the three samples of methamphetamine tested in Richardson’s 
criminal cases, each costing $100, for a total of $300.  (Aug. R., pp.7-8.)  All of these 
exhibits detailed that these requests were in relation to Richardson’s criminal cases, 
and Exhibits B and C listed the case numbers.  (Aug. R., pp.5-8.) 
Richardson stipulated to the admission of the state’s exhibits (5/19/2016 Tr., 
p.14, Ls.15-22), and specifically did not dispute the Idaho State Lab’s analysis fees (id., 
p.14, Ls.3-4).  However, counsel raised three objections to the restitution: (1) that there 
were only three controlled buys but restitution was being sought for four disbursements; 
(2) that counsel did not know how the state’s expert witness calculated his hourly rate 
and believed that the witness may have mitigated his lodging costs by traveling and 
testifying on the same day; and (3), generally, that the state was seeking restitution at 
all, as (Richardson argued) it was not a “victim” under the restitution statute.  (Id., p.13, 
L.13 – p.14, L.11.)   
Ultimately, the district court did not find Richardson’s arguments persuasive.  As 




incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigating violations of the Controlled 
Substances Act.  (Aug. R., p.10.)  And the district court found that all of the restitution 
sought was proper under Idaho Code § 37-2732(k).  (Aug. R., pp.10-11.)  It found, 
based on the testimony of Detective Dammon and the exhibits, that the state had 
expended a full $2,100 in buy money (including the challenged $300), “which was 
necessary to set up the controlled buys which led to [Richardson’s] arrest.”  (Id.)  It 
found that the expert witness testified at trial and the Idaho State Police submitted his 
travel and personnel costs in the amount of $338.46.  (Id.)  There was no evidence that 
the costs associated with the state’s expert witness were inappropriate.  (Aug. R., p.11.)  
Finally, though not challenged, the district court found that the Idaho State Police had 
expended $300 on tests confirming that the substance from Richardson’s case was 
methamphetamine.  (Aug. R., pp.10-11.) 
On appeal, Richardson must show clear error in the district court’s factual 
findings.  See Weaver, 158 Idaho at 170, 345 P.3d at 229.  He cannot do so.  Instead, 
Richardson raises two objections to the restitution award:  First, he claims that under 
State v. Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 390 P.3d 424 (2017), the cost receipt for 
expenses of the expert witness was insufficient to constitute evidence to support the 
restitution award.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.52-54.)  Second, he claims that, because Officer 
Dammon lacked direct knowledge on the final $300 payment of buy money, his 
testimony was insufficient to constitute evidence supporting that amount of restitution.  
(Appellant’s brief, p.54.)  Both arguments ultimately fail. 
Regarding the costs of the expert witness, as noted above, under Idaho Code 




Richardson’s argument on appeal that there is no evidence that restitution reflects 
actual costs, Exhibit C, on its face, is a request “for cost incurred by the Idaho State 
Police lab for travel to testify on this case 12/08/15.”  (Aug. R., p.6.)  And, contrary to 
Richardson’s assertion that “there is nothing” explaining “what the costs were for,” the 
exhibit actually delineates the costs: $205.26 for the personnel costs (which defense 
counsel apparently understood included the expert’s appearance in court and the two to 
two and a half hours of travel time between Lewiston and Coeur d’Alene, each way (see 
5/19/2016 Tr., p.20, L.4 – p.21, L.3)) and $133.20 for the expert witness’s per diem, 
lodging, and transportation expenses (Aug. R., p.6).  Because the Idaho State Police, 
as averred in the receipt and found by the district court, actually incurred these costs, 
they were entitled to the $338.46 of restitution.  The district court’s restitution award is 
therefore supported by substantial evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Second, Richardson argues that $300 of the $2,100 of restitution requested for 
the “buy money” was inappropriate because “the witness who testified only had direct 
knowledge of the payment of $1,800 … and was not present for the $300 purportedly 
spent on September 23, 2011.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.54.)  Thus, Richardson argues that 
restitution for the $300 of buy money is inappropriate because it was based on hearsay.  
That argument is without merit.  As noted above, because Idaho Code § 37-2732(k) is 
“short on specific guidance regarding the nature of a restitution award or the procedure 
to obtain such an award,” appellate courts “find guidance in the general restitution 
statute.”  Gomez, 153 Idaho at 257-258, 281 P.3d at 94-95.  Under the general 
restitution statute, I.C. § 19-5304:  
Each party shall have the right to present such evidence as may be 




hearsay as may be contained in the presentence report, victim impact 
statement or otherwise provided to the court. 
 
I.C. § 19-5304(6).  Because the district court specifically may consider hearsay that is 
relevant to the issue of restitution, and there is no argument that the officer’s testimony 
was not relevant, the district court properly considered this evidence.  The district 
court’s restitution award is therefore supported by substantial evidence and should not 
be disturbed on appeal. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Richardson’s conviction and 
sentence, and the district court’s order of restitution. 
 DATED this 19th day of June, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer_________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
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